Cheap Promises: Evidence From Loan Repayment Pledges In An Online Experiment by Bhanot, Syon
Swarthmore College 
Works 
Economics Faculty Works Economics 
8-2017 
Cheap Promises: Evidence From Loan Repayment Pledges In An 
Online Experiment 
Syon Bhanot 
Swarthmore College, sbhanot1@swarthmore.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
Syon Bhanot. (2017). "Cheap Promises: Evidence From Loan Repayment Pledges In An Online 
Experiment". Journal Of Economic Behavior And Organization. Volume 140, 246-266. DOI: 10.1016/
j.jebo.2017.04.007 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics/424 
This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in 























Across domains, people struggle to follow through on their commitments. This can happen for many
reasons, including dishonesty, forgetfulness, or insucient intrinsic motivation. Social scientists have
explored the reasons for persistent failures to follow through, suggesting that eliciting explicit promises
can be an eective way to motivate action. This paper presents a eld experiment that tests the eect of
explicit promises, in the form of honor pledges, on loan repayment rates. The experiment was conducted
with LendUp, an online lender, and targeted 4,883 rst-time borrowers with the rm. Individuals were
randomized into four groups, with the following experimental treatments: 1) having no honor pledge to
complete (control); 2) signing a given honor pledge; 3) re-typing the same honor pledge as in (2) before
signing; and 4) coming up with a personal honor pledge to type and sign. I also randomized whether
or not borrowers were reminded of the honor pledge they signed prior to the repayment deadline. The
results suggest that the honor pledge treatments had minimal impacts on repayment, and that reminders
of the pledges were similarly ineective. This suggests that borrowers who fail to repay loans do so not
because of dishonesty or behavioral biases, but because they suer from true nancial hardship and are
simply unable to repay.
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1 Introduction
A growing body of research suggests that people nd it challenging to stick to nancial commitments, be
it saving more, spending less, or repaying loans. For loan repayment in particular, borrowers may fail to
repay for one of two reasonseither the borrower wants to repay but is unable to, or the borrower does not
want to repay. In the former scenario, this could be because behavioral biases like limited attention or status
quo bias inhibit decision making (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2008, Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988, Karlan
et al. 2010), or because the borrower faces signicant nancial hardship and does not have the means to
repay. In the latter scenario, this could be because an individual is taking advantage of the loan system,
taking a loan they never intend to repay and disappearing with the money. Understanding which of these
scenarios best explains loan defaults is crucial for understanding behavior in the market for consumer loans.
Recent research in behavioral economics suggests that altering decision-making environments can help people
overcome behavioral biases and make welfare-improving nancial decisions. For example, in an experiment in
the Philippines, Ashraf et al. (2006) showed that commitment savings products increase savings substantially.
In another experiment in Uganda, Cadena and Schoar (2011) nd that text message reminders increase loan
repayment by nearly the same amount as sizable nancial incentives. Additionally, work in the laboratory
has found honor pledges and explicit promises to be an eective way to encourage honest behavior by
triggering some combination of guilt aversion, an intrinsic motivation to keep promises, and heightened
self-awareness (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, Vanberg 2008, Shu et al. 2012, Duval and Silvia 2002). These
results together suggest a possible avenue for encouraging greater loan repayment; by addressing behavioral
biases that might hinder repayment and by using honor pledges to encourage honesty, it should be possible to
encourage those who are able to repay their loans to do so. If, on the other hand, these tools are not eective
in increasing loan repayment, it suggests that delinquent borrowers may simply face nancial constraints
preventing repayment.
In this paper, I explore if and how explicit promises and behavioral tools inuence loan repayment behavior,
using a natural eld experiment with an online lender, LendUp. In the experiment, I use various honor
pledges at loan initiation, along with email reminders of the pledges, to motivate loan repayment.
This paper contributes to existing literature in two ways. First, as far as the author can tell, there are no eld
experiments testing the impact of explicit promises on real-world decision making. For example, while Shu
et al. (2012) do conduct a eld experiment involving signing an honesty pledge, they focus more on truthful
reporting than on follow up behavior. Second, most existing work focuses on peer-to-peer promise scenarios,
namely experimental games in which participants make promises to each other (Charness and Dufwenberg
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2006, Vanberg 2008, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004), rather than on promises made to institutions or rms,
as in this paper. Two exceptions are research on honor codes, mostly in the education literature (Mazar
et al. 2008, McCabe et al. 2001), and work on virginity pledges and their eect on sexual behavior (Landor
and Simmons 2014). However, while violations of honor codes in education are sometimes punished and
violations of virginity pledges may have social consequences, they do not generally have the same economic
and legal ramications as violating loan agreements. Therefore, results from research on honor codes and
virginity pledges may not generalize to contexts where legal and formal relationships bind economic actors,
as they do here.
The experiment targeted 4,883 rst-time borrowers with LendUp. These borrowers were randomized into
seven groups, using a 3x2 incomplete factorial study design. A control group received no honor pledge, and
there were three honor pledge versions used as treatments: 1) signing a given honor pledge; 2) re-typing
the same honor pledge as in treatment (1) before signing; and 3) coming up with a personal honor pledge
to type and sign. To complete the 3x2 design, I also randomized whether or not borrowers who received
an honor pledge treatment were reminded of the honor pledge they signed in an email message sent prior
to the repayment deadline. Using this design, I test the idea that making an explicit promise can motivate
repayment by giving borrowers an intrinsic reason to repay, and that reminders about those explicit promises
might increase their impact. I also disaggregate the results by income, age, and gender.
Disaggregated treatment eects are important in this context. Social scientists have found that poverty-
related concerns consume signicant mental resources for the very poor, reducing their cognitive capacity
and performance (Shah et al. 2012, Mullainathan and Shar 2013). These ndings suggest that poorer
households taking short-term loans may be more susceptible to behavioral biases, tunneling eectively on
short-run needs while neglecting problems that manifest in the longer run (like compounding loan fees).
This can be especially damaging because these borrowers generally have limited access to aordable credit,
meaning that failure to repay one loan can drive borrowers to increasingly costly or risky loan options.
Therefore, soft commitments in the form of explicit promises may be helpful in nudging lower-income
borrowers to repay, by bringing repayment into their tunnel. Alternatively, it may be the case that richer
(or older) borrowers are more behaviorally elastic than lower-income (or younger) borrowers, and therefore
more likely to respond to behavioral interventions. Finally, there is a robust literature in both psychology
and economics on dierences in decision making between men and women (Eagly and Wood 1999, Croson
and Gneezy 2009), and one might anticipate that promises may be dierentially eective by gender. My
disaggregated analysis provides some evidence on these questions.
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The results suggest that the honor pledge treatments had minimal impacts on repayment and other related
outcomes. Specically, I tracked four outcome indicators in the aftermath of the experiment: 1) paying o the
loan; 2) paying o the loan in exact accordance with the initial agreement (being a perfect payer); 3) being
overdue in repayment at some point; and 4) the number of days until repayment.1 While the honor pledge
treatments had small positive impacts on two of these outcome variables (paying o the loan and being a
perfect payer), none of the observed eects were statistically or economically signicant. Additionally, there
is little evidence to suggest that any particular honor pledge treatment outperformed any other, nor is there
evidence to support a positive impact of being reminded about the honor pledge in the days immediately
preceding the loan repayment due date. Together, this evidence suggests that loan defaults in the short-term
loan market are most likely the result of borrowers' nancial constraints, and not dishonesty or behavioral
biases inhibiting repayment.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines existing literature and provides information on the
theoretical background and hypotheses for the experiment. Section 3 outlines the experiment itself. Section
4 lays out the empirical strategy for analyzing the data from the experiment. Section 5 presents results.
Section 6 provides a discussion and concludes.
2 Background Literature and Testable Hypotheses
2.1 Promises and Honor Pledges
Existing research on motivating behavior using explicit promise statements emphasizes both our desire
to live up to the expectations of others (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, McCabe et al. 2001) and our
intrinsic motivation to keep our word and not violate pre-set agreements (Vanberg 2008, Shu et al. 2011).
For example, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) hypothesize a role for guilt aversion in sticking with our
promises, describing a guilt-averse person as one who suers from guilt to the extent he believes he hurts
others relative to what they believe they will get. Therefore, he is motivated by his beliefs about others'
beliefs.2 In both Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008), subjects who were given a chance
to communicate prior to playing a modied dictator game would exchange promises, and these promises led
to signicant changes in behavior. In Vanberg (2008), for example, 73% of dictators who made a promise to
Roll (a move that was less benecial for the dictator) stuck to their promises, whereas 52% of dictators who
made no promises about their behavior chose to Roll. Similarly, in a series of experiments, Shu et al. (2012)
1In an earlier version of this paper, six outcome variables were reported, but it was dicult to interpret two of those six
variables, as they were conditional on having been overdue in repayment. So I omit these outcome variables here.
2Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, p. 1583
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nd that dishonest behavior was reduced when participants signed an agreement before facing an opportunity
to cheat. For example, the authors nd that car insurance customers who sign an honesty pledge (I promise
that the information I am providing is true) prior to reporting their current odometer mileage ended up
reporting signicantly more miles than those who signed the same pledge only after reporting mileage. Here,
guilt aversion arguably contributes to behavior change by inducing psychological discomfort and pressure to
conform to social expectations (Pelligra 2011, Shu et al. 2012).
Promises and honor pledges can also be powerful because they trigger internal motivators. That is, by
directing an individuals' attention to their decisions, promises can elicit reection and action consistent with
the promise (Duval and Silvia 2002). This argument is similar to that ultimately put forth in Vanberg
(2008), which provides experimental evidence from the laboratory that people have a preference for keeping
promises per se.3 Additionally, identity theory suggests that this promise eect is especially powerful if
individuals feel their promises relate closely to their self-identities, since one's self-identity creates a set of
expectations that guide behavior (Stets and Burke 2000). Overall, existing research suggests that promises
and pledges can change behavior, particularly when they take advantage of internal and external motivators
and are emotionally salient (Shu et al. 2012). Therefore, I test the hypothesis that the salience of pledges is
important by exploring whether or not the eectiveness of an honor pledge depends on how borrowers are
presented with, and remember, the pledge.
Finally, it is important to distinguish between peer-to-peer promises, which dominate current experimental
evidence on the eect of promises on behavior, and promises between clients and rms. For example,
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008) paired participants in dictator games, while studies on
the eect of computer-mediated communication on cooperation in social and prisoners dilemmas has focused
on interaction between equals.4 Such designs necessarily restrict attention to a subset of interactions between
similar agents. However, some research on explicit promises has extended past peer-to-peer interactions.
Notably, work on academic honor codes focuses on promises by students to educational institutions (McCabe
et al. 2001, Mazar et al. 2008), while the experiment in Shu et al. (2012) described above tests the eect of
a promise using a eld experiment with a car insurance company. In this paper, I contribute by exploring
promise eects in the client-rm context using a eld experiment, focusing on how promises can inuence
nancial behavior between borrowers and lenderswith money at stake.
3Vanberg 2008, p. 1468
4For a review of such studies see Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007).
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2.2 Short-Term Lending and Borrower Biases
Research in social science suggests that borrowers may systematically fail to make rational decisions when
considering whether and how to repay loans (Amar et al. 2011, Brown and Lahey 2015). While a borrower's
inability to repay an existing loan is arguably the result of limited resources, the consistent failure to repay
may also be related to behavioral factors: repayment may not be salient when payment is due, borrowers
may struggle to follow through on their commitment to repay, and present-bias might lead borrowers to
improperly discount future costs and benets. The treatments in this experiment are motivated by the idea
that intrinsic motivators may help promote repayment by shifting a borrower's attention to their loans and
consequent commitments.
However, using behavioral motivators to inuence nancial decisions is not simple, and results from past
experiments on loan repayment using peer pressure (Breza 2012) and reminders (Cadena and Schoar 2011,
Karlan et al. 2016) illustrate both their eectiveness and nuances. For example, Breza (2012) presents a
eld experiment on the eect of peers on repayment rates, noting that peer eects potentially have both
positive and negative eects on repayment. Furthermore, Karlan et al. (2016) found that reminders for loan
repayment improve repayment only when the reminder included the loan ocer's name, an eect that did
not hold for rst-time borrowers.
2.3 Motivating Literature for Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The design of the experimental treatments in this paper was motivated by dierent threads of existing
behavioral literature, building on theories of guilt aversion, salience, and inattention. I briey summarize
this motivating literature and present the four central, testable hypotheses for this experiment here.
2.3.1 Explicit Promises
As described earlier, research suggests that signing an honor pledge may trigger behavior change because of
guilt aversion, an intrinsic desire to stick to our word, or our desire to perceive ourselves as moral (Charness
and Dufwenberg 2006, Vanberg 2008, Aquino and Reed 2002). This underlies all experimental treatments
and leads to a basic hypothesis:
H1: Any form of honor pledge will increase repayment.
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2.3.2 Salience
Existing research on honor pledges suggests that they need to be salient to trigger cognitive dissonance
(Shu et al. 2012), while research on the impact of directed attention suggests that simple manipulations
of individuals' level of attention can determine specic behavior (Jonas et al. 2002, Duval and Silvia 2002,
Mazar et al. 2008). In this experiment, I vary the salience of honor pledges at loan initiation by requiring
dierent levels of borrower attention in the dierent treatments. Note that I refer here to the level of salience
at the moment of the pledge, not immediately in advance of repayment (which is discussed in 2.3.4). I use
this manipulation of salience to test the following hypothesis:
H2: More salient honor pledges will be more eective in increasing repayment.
2.3.3 Self-Identity and Personalization
The eectiveness of an honor pledge may also rely on the value that borrowers place on the pledge and
how they relate to it (Stets and Burke 2000). Linking the pledge to a borrower's self-identity, for example,
could increase the likelihood of engagement with the content of the statement (Kettle and Habul 2011). In
Norton et al. (2011), the researchers nd that increased customization and perceived control over self-made
products can make them more valuable to their creatorsa phenomenon the authors call the IKEA eect.
While the study relates specically to physical objects, literature on eort justication has demonstrated
that eort can increase the perceived value of non-physical goods or experiences as well (Aronson and Mills
1959). Therefore, I hypothesize that triggering self-identity through personalization may increase a promise's
value to individuals, activating a stronger intrinsic motivation to follow through; this results in the following
hypothesis:
H3: Personalized honor pledges will be more eective in increasing repayment than
standardized ones.
2.3.4 Reminders
Finally, behavioral researchers argue that simple reminders can increase loan repayment rates (Cadena and
Schoar 2011, Karlan et al. 2016). For example, Cadena and Schoar (2011) posit that poor repayment behavior
is a result of limited nancial planning, and suggest that text message reminders increase repayment rates by
keeping debt salient. In this experiment, all participants receive email reminders about repayment, but half
receive a reminder that includes an additional section emphasizing the honor pledge made at loan initiation.
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This keeps the honor pledge dierentially salient at the moment of repayment across treatment groups, and
enables us to test the following hypothesis:




My research partner for this eld experiment was LendUp, a startup online lending rm based in San
Francisco, CA, which makes short-term loans to qualied borrowers through an online platform. The rm's
mission is to provide short term loans in a socially-responsible way. LendUp's primary method of customer
engagement is their website, where users apply for loans, get approval, and have money sent to their bank
accounts in a very short window of time.
3.1.2 Subjects
The subjects in this study were 4,883 recipients of loans through the rm over a six-month period, from
March 2013 to September 2013. The subjects were not recruitedthey were customers who came to the
LendUp website freely to take a loan, and consented to communication through the rm as part of the
borrowing agreement. No inducement was oered for their participation, and they were unaware of the
experimental nature of the borrowing process, as described here. All subjects were rst-time borrowers,
meaning they had never obtained a loan from the rm previously.
3.1.3 Study Design
Upon initiating a loan process through LendUp's online platform, subjects were randomly assigned into one
of seven conditionsone control group and six treatment groups. All groups had a similar online process
to obtain the loan, consisting of seven screens before the approval conrmation screen. Screenshots for the
onboarding loan process from the perspective of the borrower are included in Appendix 1. Importantly, the
rst six screens were the same for all individuals regardless of treatment/control group. Only the seventh
screen was dierent for the control and treatment groups; the control group had to check two boxes accepting
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Figure 1: Final Pre-Approval Screen: Control vs. Three Treatments
the terms of the loan, while the treatment groups saw the same two checkboxes along with an honor pledge
task. This ensured that dierential attrition due to the treatment was minimized (as sharing of personal
information, a potential hurdle for skeptical borrowers, was done on pre-treatment screens).
3.1.4 Treatments and Controls
I used a 3x2 incomplete factorial design, with a control group not receiving an honor pledge message at
any stage. The 3x2 setup for the six experimental treatments operated as follows. First, subjects were
randomly assigned to receive one of three honor pledge treatments on the nal pre-approval screen during
the loan initiation processreferred to hereafter as the Simple, Copy, and Write-In treatments. These
three treatments oered dierent versions of an honor pledge for the subjects, specically: 1) the Simple
treatment required them to read and sign a given, default honor pledge; 2) the Copy treatment required
them to re-type the same given, default honor pledge word-for-word into a text box, and sign it before
proceeding; and 3) the Write-In treatment required them to come up with their own honor pledge, write
it into a text box, and sign it before proceeding. Note that in all cases, the font used for the signature
was handwriting font to increase realism. Figure 1 shows the dierences between the control and three
treatment screens (visuals of the entire nal pre-approval screens across conditions are provided in Appendix
2).
Second, the subjects also diered in the type of repayment reminder they received three days before the
repayment deadline. Specically, subjects were randomly assigned to receive either the standard reminder
9
Figure 2: Reminder Email Example
email, or a reminder that made explicit reference to the honor pledge the subject signed (see Figure 2).
Note that all subjects, including the control subjects, received a reminder email. Henceforth, the treatments
that included a reminder of the honor pledge will be labeled with HP (so, Simple-HP, Copy-HP, and
Write-In-HP).
3.1.5 Fees and Logistics of the Loan Process
Borrowers took out loans for between 7 and 30 days through the site. Loans ranged from $100-$250, with a
mean loan size of $219.10. The vast majority of loans were for $200 (36.3%) or $250 (50.9%). If the chosen
loan duration at initiation was under 30 days, subjects were allowed to extend their loans up to the 30 day
maximum at any time, without penalty. The fees for the loan were 17.6% of the amount of money borrowed,
with a 30 cent-per-day reduction in fee for early repayment. Individuals who were late in repaying their
loans could opt to enter into a payment plan with the rm, negotiated on a case-by-case basis. There was a
at $15 fee for late repayment. This late repayment fee was reduced by 30 cents per day if your loan was
for under 30 days, in line with the allowance for loan extensions and the early repayment fee reduction.
Importantly, borrowers were set up for auto-repayment of their loans through an ACH transfer upon loan
initiation. In other words, the default was for loan repayment to be initiated on the due date in the initial
loan agreement. This is important because it may lead us to underestimate the behavioral eects of this
10
interventionsince the default is to repay, it may be the case that some individuals repay because it is the
default, and not because they make an active choice to repay. We revisit this in the discussion section.
3.1.6 Power
The sample size for this study was determined with the loan repayment rate outcome in mind, based on an
estimated ex-ante repayment rate of 80%, power of 0.80, and an estimated eect size of ve percentage points
(informed primarily by the ndings in Shu et al. (2012) and Karlan et al. (2010)).5 When pooling honor
pledge types (in other words, ignoring the variation in email reminder version), the study's power to detect
a ve percentage point eect rose to 0.90.6 However, I should note that LendUp was not able to guarantee
a sample size ex-ante, but instead provided a time frame during which the study would run. Therefore the
power analysis described here informed the study's duration. In the end, the sample size roughly matched,
but fell slightly shy of, the ex-ante gures needed to detect the ve percentage point eect size. The lowest
power based on the nal sample sizes for the control and any single treatment condition would have been
0.77.7
3.2 Data and Baseline Characteristics
The data were collected by LendUp, and not the researcher. The rm collected data on repayment status,
loan amounts and dates of agreement, and demographic information on the borrowers, as required by law.8
All data were collected with the consent of the customer, as required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act for
lenders. The rm removed all identiable information from the data, sharing only anonymized data with
the researcher.
3.2.1 Descriptive Data and Baseline Characteristics
I observe data from 4,883 rst-time borrowers. Table 1 outlines the number of subjects in each treatment
and control group, and summarizes the demographic variables available for individuals in these groups. In
addition, Appendix 3 provides visuals depicting the distribution of subjects' job status, age, and income.
Note that the number of observed demographic variables is limited, due to legal restrictions around sensitive
nancial transactions.
5Stata command: sampsi .8 .85, onesided power(0.8)
6Stata command: sampsi .8 .85, n1(753) n2(1506) onesided
7Stata command: sampsi .8 .85, n1(729) n2(656) onesided
8The specic data that the rm collected from each borrower are: Name, Address, Phone Number, Social Security Number,
Employer, Bank, channel data (IP address, browser, etc), and behavioral data (user actions on the LendUp website  logins,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Two particular elements of the demographic data are worth mentioning. First, subject gender was not in
the data, but LendUp was able to generate a variable (Probability Male) that captures the probability
that a given individual was male or female using an internal algorithm based on the individual's rst name.
The mean and standard deviation of this variable are reported in Table 1, along with a dummy variable for
gender, created using the Probability Male variable.9 Second, the income data are self-reported, and there
are major outliers (nine subjects reported income greater than $1,000,000, as visible in Appendix 3). This
largely explains observed variation in mean income across treatment groups.10
3.2.2 Randomization Check
A randomization check is necessary in this case for two reasons. First, the randomization process was
conducted by LendUp and not the researcher. Though the rm has a track record of experimentation and
a background in randomization procedures, the randomization check remains important.
Second, I cannot rule out attrition during the loan onboarding process. Table 1 shows that there is imperfect
balance in terms of the number of subjects in each treatment group. This is due to the fact that subjects were
randomly assigned at the initiation of the sign-up process. Therefore, any attrition during the multi-screen
sign-up process would cause an imbalance. Importantly, attrition on the rst six screens would not have been
caused by the dierences in treatment, which only happened on the seventh screen. However, it is possible
that any one of the treatments increased attrition on this seventh screen. Therefore a randomization check
is essential, to ensure balance amongst those who completed the sign-in process.
Table 2 presents the results of the randomization check. Specically, the table presents the coecients on
regressions of the various demographic characteristics (shown as yi below) on dummy variables for the six
treatment groups (shown as Tk with k ranging from 1-6 for the six treatment groups, below), omitting the
control group. The econometric model is as follows:
yi = β0+
∑6
k=1 βk(Tk)i + ε
A series of f-tests were conducted to evaluate joint-signicance of the coecients for each demographic
variable regression. The f-statistics and p-values are reported in Table 2, and suggest no strong imbal-
ances between the control and treatment groups from potential attrition issues. Nevertheless, I control for
demographic characteristics in the analysis.
9For the gender dummy variable, individuals with Probability Male greater than 99% were classied as male, while those
with Probability Male less than 1% were classied as female. All others, including those with rst names missing, were labeled
as ambiguous. This resulted in 1358 males, 1775 females, and 1750 ambiguous cases.
10Notably, the removal of observations where income exceeds $1,000,000 reduces the coecient on the Copy treatment in






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Outcome Variables
Outcome Variable Relationship to Explicit Promises and Treatments Abbreviation
1) Subject paid o loan
(dummy)
Likelihood of being paid o in full is a big-picture
measure of the ecacy of the explicit promise treatments
relative to the control.
Paid O
2) Subject was a
perfect payer (dummy)
Likelihood of sticking to the contract exactly as was
agreed is a measure of how well the explicit promise
treatments encouraged follow through, relative to the
control.
Perfect Payer
3) Subject was overdue
(dummy)
Being overdue is a sign of a failure to follow through on
the commitment made at loan initiation.
Ever Overdue
4) Days between loan
initiation and repayment
This variable is conditional on the subject paying o the
loan. If the mean days to repay is lower for a given
treatment, it suggests that subjects in that treatment felt
greater urgency to repay the loan.
Days to Pay
3.2.3 Outcome Variables
I tracked a number of repayment-relevant variables in the data over time amongst experimental subjects. In
particular, I focus on the following four outcome variables: 1) whether the subject ever paid o the loan;
2) whether the subject was a perfect payer, meaning they repaid the loan in full by the original due date
they selected when obtaining the loan; 3) whether the subject was ever overdue in repaying their loan; and
4) days between loan initiation and loan repayment (for those who repaid only).11 Figure 3 outlines the
relationship between these four outcome variables and a justication for their connection to the explicit
promise treatments.
Note that while I track four outcome variables, there are dierences in how important these variables are
as indicators of behavioral response. This is especially true since variable 4 in Figure 3, Days to Pay, is
conditional on having repaid the loan at all. Because of this, it is not obvious whether a high or low value
for this variable is a good thingon the one hand, taking longer to repay is a sign of a failure to follow
through on your commitment, but it is better to take a long time to repay than to simply not repay at all.
Indeed, we can think of there being two variables that best capture behavioral responsevariables 1 and 2
in Figure 3, Paid O and Perfect Payer. When I assess the experimental results I pay particular attention
to these two variables.
11As mentioned in footnote 1, two additional outcome variables were included in an earlier version of this paper, but are
omitted here because they are dicult to interpret (they were conditional on having been overdue in repayment). The results
were similar for these two omitted variables, so their omission does not substantively alter my ndings.
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4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Average Treatment Eects
I rst compute average treatment eects using regressions, with a linear probability model specication for
instances where the dependent variable is binary. The regression specication is as follows:
yi = β0+
∑6
m=1 βm(Tm)i + γi + ηi + ε
I control for loan characteristics (loan amount and days of the loan, shown as γi above) and demographics
of the borrower (job type, pay frequency, pay type, log of income, and age, shown as ηi above) in these
regressions. Note that I do not control for gender in the specication above, since I do not have a certain
measure of borrower gender (though I do incorporate the gender variable in section 4.3 and include the
variable in a robustness check as described in section 4.4).
4.2 Grouping Treatments and Isolating Reminder Eects
One plausible ex-ante prediction might be that the addition of a reminder of the honor pledge would not
have a large impact, particularly given that all subjects received some form of email reminder from the rm.
For example, if people did not read the reminder email carefully or simply deleted it without reading it,
we would expect no signicant dierence between a given honor pledge version with or without the added
reminder. If that is the case, an alternative specication that pools honor pledge treatments by type of
pledge and adds a dummy variable for a common reminder eect would be a plausible way to estimate
treatment eects. Indeed, this specication would have the added benet of increasing the sample size within
each pledge type and reducing standard errors.
The process to generate a specication for this analysis is as follows. First, I create three dummy variables for
All Simple, All Copy, and All Write-In treatments by pooling subjects who received each honor pledge
type, ignoring whether or not they received the added honor pledge reminder (these dummy variables are
shown below as (
∑3
m=1(TGm)i). I then create a dummy variable (shown as PledgeTreat∗Reminder below)
that interacts a dummy for being in any honor pledge treatment at loan initiation (in other words, being in
any group except the controlshown as PledgeTreat below) with a dummy for receiving a reminder email
that makes explicit reference to the honor pledge (shown as Reminder below). I then run the regression
specication below, with added controls for loan characteristics (loan amount and days of the loan) shown




m=1 βm(TGm)i + β4(PledgeTreat ∗Reminder) + γi + ηi + ε
The β1, β2 and β3 regression coecients in this specication estimate the average treatment eect of each
type of honor pledge (Simple, Copy, and Write-In) without the honor pledge reminder, while the β4 coecient
estimates the eect of the honor pledge reminder across all honor pledge treatments. Note that I also run an
alternative version of this specicationone that omits the β4(PledgeTreat ∗Reminder) term, and simply
estimates the average treatment eect of the three honor pledge types without isolating a constant reminder
eect across treatments.
Finally, I run a regression that pools all six treatments into one large honor pledge group and estimates the
average treatment eect of some type of honor pledge at initiation, relative to the control. This specication
provides an estimate of the eect of the pledges and pledge reminders as an overall approach, ignoring the
dierences between the specic pledge treatment conditions.
4.3 Disaggregated and Conditional Average Treatment Eects
Finally, I compute disaggregated and conditional average treatment eects based on prior characteristics.
In particular, I focus on three covariates: income, age, and gender. The logic for choosing these three
is as follows. First, one could hypothesize that low-income borrowers are more prone to behavioral bias
around loan repayment, and therefore more likely to be inuenced by the behavioral treatments than high-
income borrowers. To explore this, I break subjects into thirds based on self-reported income, and estimate
conditional average treatment eects by income thirds using the same specication as in section 4.1.
Second, I explore the idea that making an explicit promise might mean more or less for a younger borrower
than an older one. There are multiple hypotheses possible here. Younger borrowers may be less self-
aware about their nancial decisions than their adult counterparts, making an explicit promise more likely
to inuence their behavior. Alternatively, one could argue that adults are more likely to take a promise
seriously than a younger borrower.12 To test this, I interact a continuous variable for subject age with
the treatment variables to obtain an estimate of how the treatment eects dier by age. The regression
specication for this analysis is as follows, with controls for loan characteristics (loan amount and days of
the loan) shown as γi, and demographics of the borrower (job type, pay frequency, pay type, and log of
income) shown as ηi:
12There is reason to suspect that self-awareness varies a great deal within individual adults. As Rochat (2003) notes: As
adults, we are constantly oscillating in our levels of awareness: from dreaming or losing awareness about ourselves during sleep,
to being highly self-conscious in public circumstances or in a state of confusion and dissociation as we immerse ourselves in






m=7 βm(Tm)i + β13(Age) + γi + ηi + ε
The β1-β6 regression coecients are the key coecients in this specication, as they will provide us with an
estimate of how the outcome variables dier by age across the treatments.
Third, there is a large body of literature in psychology and economics looking into how decision making diers
by gender. For example, existing research suggests that women may be more likely to think of communal
wellbeing (Eagly and Wood 1999) or contextual factors (Eckel and Grossman 1996) when making decisions,
two features we might associate with the explicit promise treatments. To explore this, I rst restrict analysis
to subjects whom the gender algorithm (described in section 3.2.1) reports as being either male or female
with at least 99% certainty. I then interact a dummy variable for male with the treatment variables, to
obtain estimates of dierences in treatment eects by gender. The regression specication for this analysis
is as follows, with controls for loan characteristics (loan amount and days of the loan) shown as γi, and





m=7 βm(Tm)i + β13Male+ γi + ηi + ε
Again, β1-β6 are the key coecients, providing an estimate of the dierential impact of the various treatments
for men relative to women. That said, the β7-β12 coecients are also important, as they provide an estimate
of average treatment eects for women only, across treatment versions.
4.4 Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of my ndings, I re-ran the analyses above with a few small modications. First,
I re-ran all analyses from sections 4.1 and 4.2 with the following modications to the covariate controls:
1) including the Probability Male variable; 2) including age as a categorical variable (with ten year age
ranges); and 3) including a quadratic term on the age variable. In addition, in all my analysis of the Days to
Pay variable, I conducted Mann-Whitney tests in addition to the analyses outlined above. For all of these
checks, the results did not dier qualitatively from the ones described below, so I have omitted discussions
of these modied specications.
5 Results
Tables 3-7 present a comprehensive report of the regression results, and show the estimated treatment
eects for each outcome variable. Recall again that while I report on four outcome variables, I am especially
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Table 3: Average Treatment Eects on Outcomes: All Subjects
All Borrowers Repayers Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Paid O Perfect Payer Ever Overdue Days to Pay
Simple 0.019 0.0056 -0.0036 0.74
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.93)
Simple-HP 0.0039 0.0067 0.012 0.35
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.92)
Copy 0.025 0.029 -0.014 0.29
(0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.85)
Copy-HP 0.012 0.019 0.0018 -0.11
(0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.82)
WriteIn 0.0078 0.020 -0.00075 -0.067
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.79)
WriteIn-HP 0.0069 0.0038 0.0028 0.71
(0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.98)
Constant 0.78∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.11 8.75∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.12) (0.098) (3.20)
Observations 4883 4883 4883 3877
R2 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.170
Demog. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: All regression estimates above include controls for loan characteristics (loan amount,
days of initial loan) and borrower demographics (age, log of self-reported income, job category
of borrower, pay frequency and form for borrower (cash vs. direct deposit vs. check)). Speci-
cations (1)-(3) report on outcomes where data exists for all borrowers, while specication (4)
reports on an outcome that is conditional on having actually repaid the loan. Additionally, the
dependent variable in specications (1)-(3) are binary (whether or not subjects completed each
of the three aspects in loan repayment), while in specication (4) it is continuous (days).
interested in the Paid O and Perfect Payer outcomes. Results at the aggregate level (section 4.1) are
presented in Tables 3 and 4, with controls,13 while Tables 5 and 6 report pooled and honor pledge reminder
isolating estimates at the aggregate level (section 4.2). Table 7 reports estimates by income group (section
4.3).
The results in Table 3 show that subjects in all honor pledge treatments were slightly more likely to pay o
their loans and be perfect payers than those in the control group. The eect sizes for these two variables
range from roughly 0-4 percentage points. However, none of these eects were statistically signicant, and
joint hypothesis tests on all treatment coecients conrm that I cannot reject a null hypothesis that the
various honor pledges had no eect on the key outcome variables. Additionally, the average treatment eects
13Though the estimates reported in the paper include control variables, regressions without controls yield similar results and
are provided in the online appendix (Table 1) for this paper.
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Table 4: Estimated Outcome Values for Average Subjects, by Treatment
Control Simple Simple- Copy Copy- Write-In Write-In-
HP HP HP
1) Subject paid 78.3% 80.3% 78.7% 80.8% 79.5% 79.1% 79.0%
o loan (t=0.90) (t=0.18) (t=1.18) (t=0.58) (t=0.36) (t=0.33)
2) Subject was a 56.8% 57.4% 57.5% 59.7% 58.7% 58.8% 57.2%
"perfect payer" (t=0.21) (t=0.25) (t=1.13) (t=0.75) (t=0.78) (t=0.15)
3) Subject was 25.2% 24.8% 26.4% 23.8% 25.4% 25.1% 25.5%
overdue (t=0.16) (t=0.52) (t=0.61) (t=0.08) (t=0.03) (t=0.12)
4) Days between 26.2% 26.9% 26.5% 26.5% 26.1% 26.1% 26.9%
loan initiation (t=0.80) (t=0.38) (t=0.34) (t=0.14) (t=0.08) (t=0.72)
and repayment
Notes: Expected values for outcome variables by treatment based on regression outcomes, using average population
values for covariates. The t-statistics in parentheses capture the dierence between the expected values for the
treatments and the control, as reported in the rst column of the table.
for the other two variables are mixed, further suggesting that the honor pledge treatments had minimal
impacts. Additionally, there is little to suggest that any individual honor pledge treatment performed
dierentially better than any other, on aggregate. Table 4 presents the results of Table 3 in a dierent way,
showing the expected values of the four key outcome variables by condition, assuming average population
values for the covariates used as controls in the regressions. Note that none of the observed dierences
between treatment and control outcomes are statistically signicantTable 4 also includes t-statistics for
the dierences between control group and the individual treatment groups in parentheses.
Tables 5 and 6 pool the six treatments into broader categories of treatment, in three ways for each outcome
variable. The rst model for each outcome pools subjects by honor pledge type, ignoring the variation in
reminder version. The second model for each outcome adds an interaction term, allowing for a constant
reminder eect across pooled honor pledge types. The third model for each outcome pools all honor pledge
treatments together to form one large treatment group, to compare to the control. Table 5 presents the
results for the two key outcome variables, Paid O and Perfect Payer, and consistently shows no statistically
signicant eects of the honor pledges across models. The results in Table 6 provide similar conclusions
for the Ever Overdue and Days to Pay outcome variables. Furthermore, across the board, reminders of the
honor pledge had no eect on outcomes, with the interaction terms in specications (2) and (5) in both
Tables 5 and 6 showing coecients indistinguishable from zero.
Taken together, the results from Tables 3-6 provide direct evidence regarding the four hypotheses outlined
in section 2.3. First, the results suggest that none of the honor pledge treatments had a signicant eect
on repayment rates, even when the pledge treatments were pooled together in specications (3) and (6)
in Tables 5 and 6. Second, pledges that were more salient at the moment of the pledge did not perform
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Table 5: ATEs on Paid O & Perfect Payer Outcomes (Treatments Grouped)
Outcome: Paid O Outcome: Perfect Payer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Simple 0.012 0.016 0.0062 0.010
(0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024)
All Copy 0.018 0.023 0.024 0.029
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024)
All WriteIn 0.0073 0.012 0.012 0.016
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
Treatment * Reminder -0.0096 -0.0087
(0.012) (0.015)
Pooled Treatments 0.012 0.014
(0.016) (0.020)
Constant 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 4883 4883 4883 4883 4883 4883
R2 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.030 0.030 0.029
Demog. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: All regression estimates above include controls for loan characteristics (loan amount, days of
initial loan) and borrower demographics (age, log of self-reported income, job category of borrower,
pay frequency and form for borrower (cash vs. direct deposit vs. check)). Specications (1)-(3)
report on the binary Paid O outcome variable, pooling treatments in a variety of ways: specication
(1) pools treatments by honor pledge type; specication (2) pools treatments by honor pledge
type but includes an interaction eect to extract a common "honor pledge reminder" eect; and
specication (3) pools all honor pledge treatments together). Specications (4)-(6) do the same, but
for the binary Perfect Payer outcome variable.
better than those that were less salient, as evidenced by the fact that the coecients for the Copy and
Write-In treatments were statistically indistinguishable from those for the Simple treatments. Third, there
is no evidence that personalizing the honor pledges improved their ecacy; the Write-In pledge treatments
clearly did not outperform any of the other treatments. Finally, there is no evidence that salient reminders
of the honor pledge immediately before the loan repayment due date had any impact on loan repayment.
In fact, the coecients on the interaction terms for receiving an honor pledge treatment and receiving a
reminder in Tables 5 and 6 (Treatment*Reminder in the tables) show, if anything, a detrimental eect of
these remindersthough these eects are not statistically signicant.
Of course, these aggregate level results might mask heterogeneities of eects amongst subgroups. I explore
this possibility using the specications outlined in section 4.3, starting with disaggregation by income (divid-
ing the population into three groups based on self-reported income). Table 7 provides estimates of average
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Table 6: ATEs on Ever Overdue & Days to Pay Outcomes (Treatments Grouped)
Outcome: Ever Overdue Outcome: Days To Pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Simple 0.0042 -0.0015 0.55 0.55
(0.020) (0.021) (0.79) (0.83)
All Copy -0.0058 -0.012 0.085 0.084
(0.020) (0.021) (0.73) (0.78)
All WriteIn 0.0011 -0.0048 0.33 0.32
(0.020) (0.021) (0.76) (0.76)
Treatment * Reminder 0.012 0.0028
(0.013) (0.52)
Pooled Treatments -0.00027 0.31
(0.017) (0.65)
Constant 0.12 0.11 0.12 8.85∗∗∗ 8.85∗∗∗ 8.83∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (3.21) (3.23) (3.20)
Observations 4883 4883 4883 3877 3877 3877
R2 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.170 0.170 0.170
Demog. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: All regression estimates above include controls for loan characteristics (loan amount, days of
initial loan) and borrower demographics (age, log of self-reported income, job category of borrower,
pay frequency and form for borrower (cash vs. direct deposit vs. check)). Specications (1)-(3) report
on the binary Ever Overdue outcome variable, pooling treatments in a variety of ways: specication
(1) pools treatments by honor pledge type; specication (2) pools treatments by honor pledge type but
includes an interaction eect to extract a common "honor pledge reminder" eect; and specication
(3) pools all honor pledge treatments together).
Specications (4)-(6) do the same, but for the continuous Days to Pay outcome variable.
treatment eects for each of the income groups on three key outcome variables, while Figures 4 and 5 plot
the regression coecients from Table 7 for the two main outcome variables, Paid O and Perfect Payer, by
income group.
Though the coecients are not all statistically signicant, the gures show an interesting pattern. Specif-
ically, the treatments seemed to work marginally better for high- and middle-income borrowers than for
low-income borrowers. For example, Figure 5 shows that all but the Copy treatment were associated with
decreases in the likelihood that a poorest-third borrower was a perfect payer, while all treatments made
a richest-third borrower more likely to be a perfect payer (and most were ecacious on middle-income
borrowers also).
One might argue that these patterns in the data occur because higher-income borrowers nd it easier or more
important to stick to promises than lower-income borrowers. However, most eect sizes are not large enough
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Figure 4: Average Treatment Eects on Paying O Loan, by Income
This gure displays the average treatment eects, relative to the control group and disaggregated by self-reported income, of
the honor pledge treatments on paying o the loan. Standard errors are included as error bars.
Figure 5: Average Treatment Eects on being a Perfect Payer, by Income
This gure displays the average treatment eects, relative to the control group and disaggregated by self-reported income, of
the honor pledge treatments on repaying in accordance with the initially selected due date (being a "perfect payer"). Standard

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to be statistically signicant, so I cannot make any denitive claims about potential dierential impacts of
the honor pledges by income. However, these results are certainly not suggestive of any dierentially large
impact of this intervention on the behavior of the poorest individuals in the subject pool, a pattern we would
have expected if heightened behavioral biases stemming from poverty were driving a failure to repay loans
for the poorest borrowers.
Lastly, I report on the disaggregated treatment eects by age and gender in Tables 2 and 3 of the online
appendix, respectively. The results for both are mixed, with some evidence that the honor pledge treatments
were less ecacious for older borrowers. In particular, the results suggest that the treatments (particularly
the Simple and Write-In treatments) were less eective at encouraging older borrowers to be perfect payers
(with both coecients signicant at a 90% level; see specication (2) in Table 2 of the online appendix).
However, given the eect sizes and standard errors, there is not sucient evidence to suggest a strong dier-
ential impact of honor pledge treatments by age. Meanwhile, the results are not suggestive of signicantly
dierent treatment eects by gender, with mixed results across outcome variables.
6 Discussion
Literature in experimental economics and psychology often nds impacts of promises and explicit honor
pledges on behavior, and in particular on reducing dishonest behavior. However, the results of this eld
experiment suggest no meaningful eects from an explicit promise (and indeed, a salient promise) on loan
repayment behavior in a real-world setting, with money at stake. Furthermore, a self-written honor pledge
was no more ecacious than any other, and altering the salience of the honor pledge, both at loan initiation
and in reminder emails, had negligible impacts on outcomes. In other words, I nd no evidence for the
hypotheses that salience, reminders, or personalization strengthen the impact of a promise on behavior.
Indeed, the results of the study suggest that online loan repayment is a domain where such behavioral
tools do not have an impact on decisions. This is a signicant result, because it provides insights into why
borrowers might fail to repay loans; most notably, it suggests that the failure to repay short-term loans
may not be a question of dishonest behavior or behavioral biases, but rather an indication of true nancial
hardship. Simply put, when repayment is not nancially possible, framing, reminders, or other interventions
utilizing behavioral science are of limited use.
There are several alternative explanations for the results of the experiment, which I do not nd as compelling.
First, one might argue that the experimental interventions were not impactful enough to change behavior.
However, the design made the explicit promise salient to the borrowerindeed, in the Copy and Write-
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In conditions, borrowers were forced to physically type in and sign promise statements. Furthermore, the
experiment was well-powered to detect meaningful eects, especially when all treatments were pooled.14
Given the intervention's salience and statistical power, the lack of any detectable eect is noteworthy. Second,
in this case borrowers were defaulted into repaying the loanLendUp automatically initiated loan repayment
on the due date in the absence of communication from the borrower. Therefore it is possible that some
subjects did not wish to repay their loan (despite having sucient funds to do so), but forgot to contact
the rm to cancel the repayment. In an experiment without the repayment default, we might have seen
lower repayment rates across all subjects, but relatively higher repayment in the honor pledge conditions,
where the honor pledge may have turned what would have been accidental repayers swayed by the default
into willing repayers. This limits the external validity of the ndings here, to some extent; we cannot
know if a pledge intervention would be more impactful in an environment without a default, or indeed any
environment where borrowers are especially attentive to loan due dates. That said, 20% of subjects in this
study did stop repayment in all conditions, suggesting that subjects did not nd it burdensome to overcome
the default.
Third, subjects may have been so overwhelmed by their poor nancial situation that they avoided commu-
nications about the loan (the reminder email) and just followed the default course of action. This relates
to the idea of ostriching, or ignoring unwanted or complex information (Liebman and Zeckhauser 2004).
However, while this could explain why including the honor pledge in the email reminder had a minimal eect,
it would not explain why the upfront signing of the honor pledge was not impactful.
This experiment and its results come with caveats, and raise conceptually-interesting points that relate to
the external validity of the ndings. First, this study involved a promise made digitally by a client (the
borrower) to a rm (the lender), which may have facilitated a cheap promise by the borrower. That is,
a borrower might have found a promise made to a faceless, online rm easier to ignore and renege on than
a similar promise to an individual, a peer, or in-person at a rm. There is support for this hypothesis in
the literature. For example, Karlan et al. (2016) nds that repayment reminders are more eective when
they included the loan ocer's name, while Chou (2015) discusses how e-signatures may encourage greater
dishonesty relative to signing by hand.
Second, the promises in this experiment were explicitly privatemade by an individual to a rm, with no
third party involvement. In the real world, many promises have a social component, in that you suer a
social or publicly-observable sanction for failing to adhere to your promise. This explains why honor codes
are so widely used in academic contexts; in these instances, the social stigma associated with violation of the
14The minimum detectable eect with power of 0.8, when all treatments are pooled and based on the nal sample size, was
roughly 3.88 percentage points (Stata command: sampsi .8 .8388, n1(729) n2(4154) onesided).
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honor code may be as great a deterrent as the punishment for the violation. If this is an important factor in
the ecacy of explicit promises, it may explain why the promises in this experiment were not as eective at
changing behaviorthis experiment relied more on internal motivation that external motivation.
Finally, the results from this experiment suggest that loan repayment may simply be a behavior that is
less manipulable through behavioral interventionsor less behaviorally elastic. For example, in this ex-
periment, subjects who did not repay their loan arguably faced nancial constraints preventing them from
changing their behavior. Notably, past studies on promises focused on contexts where following through
on a promise was always an available option; with academic honor codes, students can elect not to cheat,
while in dictator games, subjects can send the promised amount of money. In other words, behavior in
these instances is arguably more elastic than loan repayment behavior. Future studies that compellingly
vary behavioral elasticity would help us better understand whether observed responses to behavioral in-
terventions are due to underlying behavioral biases and quirks in human decision making, or simply to the
magnitude of behavioral elasticities in the specic experimental context.
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Appendix 1: Sign Up Screens
Screen #1: Initiate Process
Screen #2: Sign Up
Screen #3: Personal Info
Screen #4: Employment Info
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Screen #5: Direct Deposit Information
Screen #6: Verication
Screen #7: **Honor Pledge/Treatment Screen**
Screen #8: Conrmation
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Appendix 2: Control and Treatment Screens
Control Final Pre-Approval Screen:
Simple Honor Pledge Final Pre-Approval Screen:
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Copy Honor Pledge Final Pre-Approval Screen:
Write-In Honor Pledge Final Pre-Approval Screen:
34
Appendix 3: Demographics Charts
Chart (A)
Chart (B)
Chart (C)
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